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MILITARY SCIENCE, THEORY, STRATEGY

MAR SU I. BAGRAMYAN ON OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR II

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jul 81 p 2

[Article by Mar SU I. Bagramyan, two times Hero of the Soviet Union: "At the Beginning of the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] Today, 40 years after the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the secrets uncovered in Nazi archives show irrefutably that the treacherous attack by the Wehrmacht on the Soviet Union was the result of a general policy of German imperialism spanning 20 years. During preparation for the attack on the USSR Hitler's general staff put its main hopes on the devastating power of the unexpected first strike by massed aircraft, tanks, and infantry and on a swift dash by them to the vital centers of our Homeland. This unprincipled venture was based on the traditional doctrine of German militarism. The first strike included not only all the striking force of the German Reich and its satellites, but all the know-how accumulated in earlier wars in Europe. The fascist rulers were so confident of their power and the infallibility of their "blitzkrieg" plans that they did not even think of the problems of a protracted war. The Nazi strategists did not expect resistance from all the people, which transformed the struggle of the Soviet people against the aggressors into what was truly a Great Patriotic War from its first days. The Germans thought that they would be finished with the Soviet Union in 1941.

Early in the morning of 22 June 1941 our country was hit not by an "improvised" attack as bourgeois falsifiers of history were to say later, but rather by a carefully prepared, treacherous, and unexpected strike by the largest and most powerful military machine.

By the start of the war fascist Germany and its satellites had concentrated and deployed 190 full-strength, fully equipped, and well-trained divisions near the borders of the Soviet Union. These units had more than 3,500 tanks and more than 50,000 artillery guns and mortars. The fascist German air forces that were to participate in the attack on the USSR had more than 3,900 planes.

But a question arises: to what degree were we ready to repulse such a powerful strike, which moreover was unexpected? I will only emphasize the fact that whereas Germany, preparing for a planned attack on the USSR, had already reorganized its economy on a military footing and completely mobilized and deployed

the Wehrmacht for the surprise attack, the Soviet Union was unable to carry out these important steps. In particular, we did not even manage to deploy the cover armies allocated for the border districts to defend the state border.

The enemy had a 3-4-fold superiority over Soviet forces in men and equipment in the key axes. It is true that the forces of all the western border military districts were committed later and their number reached 170 divisions (the second operational echelon). But roughly half of them were committed to battle at peacetime strength. Strategic reserves were not brought up and committed to battle until early July.

Moreover, the advantage in technical equipment in the initial period of the war was clearly on the side of the enemy. Thus, fascist Germany and the Soviet Union entered the war under extremely unequal conditions.

Under the Barbarossa plan the immediate objective of the Nazi command was to isolate the forces of the Soviet border districts and wipe them out west of the Zapadnaya Dvina and Dnepr rivers with strikes by tank groups and field armies supported by aviation in the Dvina, Minsk-Smolensk, and Kiev axes in order to open the way for an unobstructed move to Leningrad, Moscow, and the Donets basin. The unexpected enemy invasion accompanied by heavy aerial bombing was carried out by enormous numbers of tanks and motorized infantry. The Soviet forces, under unexpected attack, were forced to fight in extremely unfavorable conditions. Despite this, from the very first hours of the war, guided by a desire to halt the invasion, they offered strong resistance to the enemy and fought with unusual heroism and fortitude.

The uncompromising class nature of the war predetermined, from the first days, its enormous scope and the highly dynamic and bitter nature of the fighting. The initial operations of the war were highly mobile operations with a great diversity of forms and methods. At the beginning of the war the Soviet command attempted to stop the advance of the enemy strike group and throw them back to their starting place. Our troops used an active, mobile strategic defense to counter the treacherous operations of the Wehrmacht, attempting to undermine the enemy's offensive capabilities, wear down his strike groups, and render them harmless. Our forces combined a stubborn defense of the positions occupied with daring counterattacks and army and front counterstrikes, usually involving the participation of large tank units. Our units fought bitterly in encirclement and frequently inflicted tangible losses on the enemy when breaking out.

Accomplishment of the missions of strategic defense depended largely on where the main efforts of the Armed Forces were concentrated. The Headquarters, of the Supreme Command correctly determined that the decisive one of the three strategic axes was the one in which the Wehrmacht was delivering its main strike. The importance of this access was furthered by the fact that it led to Moscow, the political, administrative, and industrial center of the country, the most important center of roads and all other forms of communication, and the national capital. It was here, in the western Moscow axis, that Headquarters used 70 percent of our reserves in July. The northwestern and southwestern axes were reinforced at the same time. These effective measures brought the enemy advance in the axis of the main strike to a halt and then forced the enemy to go over to the defense temporarily.

On 25-28 June the reserve army group of the Supreme Command, headed by Mar SU S. M. Budenny, began to be formed. It consisted of four armies (19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd) which were deployed in the rear of the Western Front. This group was given the mission of putting up a strong defense to cover the Smolensk axis. The 16th Army was also being put under the group commander in the Smolensk region. To further reinforce the western axis, a few days later the 24th and 28th reserve armies began deploying on the line Nelidovo, Yel'nya, Desna River (to Zhukovka), in the rear of S. M. Budenny's group.

On 2 July Headquarters transferred the 22nd, 19th, 20th, and 21st armies to the Western Front to restore its defense in the Smolensk axis as quickly as possible. By the start of 9 July the enemy advance had been halted along the entire front from the town of Disna to Zhlobin.

The Battle of Smolensk which developed in this situation was one of the important operations of the summer of 1941. "Although we were not able to smash the enemy," Mar SU G. K. Zhukov observes in his memoirs, "his strike groups were greatly worn down." By the admission of Nazi generals the fascists lost 250,000 officers and enlisted men in the Battle of Smolensk. The Nazi command ordered Army Group Center to go over to the defense.

Our troops also fought valiantly in the Southwestern Front. A major encounter tank battle involving up to 1,500 tanks developed between 23 and 29 June in the Lutsk, Radekhov, Brody, Rovno region. The main efforts of the troops of our Southwestern Front were aimed at smashing the enemy's 1st Tank Group. The assessment of this battle by German General Goth is very interesting: "Army Group South had the hardest time of all. The enemy forces defending in front of the units of the northern flank were thrown back from the border, but they recovered quickly from the surprise attack and stopped the advance of German forces using counterattacks by their reserves and tank units that had been deployed in depth. The operational breakthrough of the 1st Tank Group attached to the 6th Army was not achieved until 28 June. Powerful enemy counterstrikes proved to be substantial obstacles in the path of the advance of our German units."

Regrouping forces after a week of bitter fighting, however, the 1st German Tank Group supported by almost all the forces of the 6th Field Army struck at the poorly secured junction of our 5th and 6th armies and broke through toward Ostrog. On 7-9 July mobile enemy units broke through to the distant approaches to Kiev.

The heroic defense of Kiev lasted 71 days. All enemy attempts to break onto the left bank of the Dnepr near the city were thwarted, in July and in August.

In the northwestern axis after the unsuccessful border fight our forces temporarily dug in on the Pyarnu-Tartu line, and then stopped the advance of Army Group North for about a month on the Luzhskiy defensive line.

Although we were unable to establish a solid and strong strategic front of defense by mid-July which is when enemy tank units reached the line Gaudskoye Lake, Vitebsk, Orsha, Dnepr, major organizational steps taken by Headquarters

had important consequences. The troops of the first strategic echelon, withdrawing from the border in heavy fighting, retreated to positions where troops of the second strategic echelon were already deployed. Thanks to the stubborn resistance of Soviet troops the rate of enemy advance was cut sharply, from 30 kilometers a day in the first days of the war to 6-7 kilometers a day.

By mid-July the Nazi headquarters had also begun to understand that the Wehrmacht could not follow the Barbarossa plan unthinkingly. On 19 July directive No 33 on "Further Waging of the War in the East" was issued. It was followed on 30 July 1941 by directive No 34, in which Hitler revoked one of his own orders for the first time in World War II.

The new directive delineated the range of offensive missions of army groups North and South and ordered Army Group Center to go over to the defense. In other words, it recognized that the missions of the Barbarossa plan had not been accomplished in any strategic axis. The expectation of wiping out the main forces of the Red Army west of the Zapadnaya Dvina and Dnepr rivers and ending the war quickly failed. It was at precisely this time that Hitler was forced to say to his close associates, "We opened the doors to Russia wide without knowing what awaited us there."

The blitzkrieg strategy had shown a faithful flaw. For this reason Hitler began to speak of the need to take over the key economic regions of the Soviet Union before attacking Moscow. The war entered a qualitatively new stage, one unforeseen by the Nazi strategists. As a result the Soviet political and military leadership gained time to carry out measures to further the development of the deeply echeloned defense in the western axis and prepare the strategic reserves who later played a decisive role in our first strategic victory, the victory at Moscow which marked the beginning of the turning point in the war.

Thus, we can consider the initial period of the Great Patriotic War to have ended between 19 and 20 July. Despite the fact that fascist Germany put all the resources it could from its own country and from the other countries of Western Europe into the blitzkrieg strategy, it was unable to smash the Soviet Armed Forces. General Field Marshal Brauchitch, commander of German ground forces, remarked at that time: "So, in the end the Russians did what they had to do."

The glory of the achievement of our fighting men at that time is that they withstood a first strike of enormous power, the enemy's main hope in the war against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Armed Forces made their first, and a very significant contribution to thwarting the evil conception of the Barbarossa plan and prepared the conditions to turn the war around.

The lessons of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War are unquestionably instructive for our military leaders. We, the older generation, know very well what efforts and sacrifices were needed to overcome the difficulties that resulted from certain omissions that took place just before the war. And it is our duty to pass on our experience to the current generation of military men so that nothing like what happened 40 years ago will ever be repeated, under any circumstances.

GROUND FORCES

AIRBORNE TROOPS: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Training Equipment Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jun 81 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt A. Oliynik: "Drill Before the Guard"]

[Text] This training activity, just as every other one, began in the customary way: with announcement of the objective, and specification of training items. The paratroopers were preparing to perform a guard assignment. The attention of all the men was focused on a wired model -- an exact copy of the unit's complex of guarded facilities. The company would be guarding these facilities.

The training class leader -- company commander Gds Sr Lt V. Malyk -- after determining the level of men's knowledge of the appropriate provisions of military regulations and their guard post duties, stated: "I am switching on the wired guard post location diagram." Gds Pfc V. Likhatskiy closely watched the pulsating bulb. He was paying close attention: the officer had illuminated on the model the boundaries of the post which he would be guarding, and the sentry's route.

A green trace approached the screen representing the fence on the model, and a siren immediately sounded. It would continue sounding as long as the pulsating light moved along the fence. This is how a sentry special-attention zone is designated on the model.

While the paratroopers were studying a sentry's special duties when standing guard duty, my attention was drawn to an attractively arranged photodisplay entitled "They Distinguished Themselves on Guard Duty." The display contained portraits of excellent guard duty performers, examples of news bulletin sheets, Komsomol group organizer and agitator file folders, their guard duty work plans, etc. In short, everything needed for conducting efficient party-political work among guard personnel. Incidentally, the materials in this display were later utilized skillfully by company political worker Gds Lt S. Pershin, when he was instructing guard personnel activists.

...The green and red lights went out one after the other. But it was evident from the absorbed expression on the paratroopers' faces that they had liked the training class with the wired model and that it had been quite beneficial.

"This classroom was set up by unit efficiency innovators headed by Gds Maj Yu. Voshchenkov," related Airborne Troops service officer Col Yu. Savilov. "Preparation for standing guard duty here is transformed for the men into an interesting process of learning and acquisition of solid skills. In this way the 'capacity' of each minute is increased."

The second part of the training class was held at specially equipped training stations. Here the men worked in a practical manner on various items pertaining to standing guard duty.

Gds Pfc I. Roman was positioned on a watchtower. He vigilantly maintained surveillance, closely watching some brush, an area of particular attention focus. Suddenly a man appeared among a group of nut trees, not far from the "Prohibited Area" sign. Guards Senior Lieutenant Malyk had raised one of the targets with his automated control panel.

"Halt, get back!" the sentry shouted.

If Roman had responded incorrectly, the target would have continued standing.

His response was correct -- the target disappeared. But another one immediately appeared -- this time in the prohibited area.

"Halt or I'll fire!" the paratrooper warned, simultaneously pressing the alarm button.

Shots rang out in response: pyrotechnic cartridges, simulating gunfire by the intruder, were triggered on command by the instructor.

Guards Pfc Roman was on the ground in a flash. Taking shelter in a foxhole, he opened fire. The target dropped.

Things were also tense at the other training station: at the weapon loading area, next to the mock-up of locked and sealed doors, and by the fire board. Gds Pfc A. Red'ka, for example, was to put out a fire which had started in his guard post area. Spotting tongues of flame, the guard immediately ran for the fire extinguisher.

"Stop!" the instructor shouted. "You forgot to alert the commander of the guard about the fire. Let's start over...."

This time the paratrooper performed flawlessly and quickly put out the fire.

The training drill described above was attended by Maj Gen L. Kuz'menko deputy chief of staff of Airborne Troops. The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent asked him for his opinion about the guard duties training area where the drill was held.

"More and more guard duties training areas in airborne troops subunits and units are of this type, and in particular contain classrooms with wired models and other automatic equipment. The guard duties training area of one of the units of the Chernigov Red-Banner Guards Airborne Division, for example, was highly praised by the experts.

The documentation dealing with setting it up was sent out to all units and, as we see, is finding practical application. It is praiseworthy that local efficiency innovators are seeking to make the training facility even more versatile. Automatic control, modern technical training and monitoring devices, and effective simulation are placed in the service of vigilance training here. Practical experience indicates that drills at such guard duties training areas make it possible to develop excellent morale-fighting qualities in the men. This is graphically confirmed by the example not only of Guards Senior Lieutenant Malyk's men, who are discussed in the article, but of the entire unit -- the quality of guard duty here has recently improved considerably.

"Not everywhere, however, is adequate attention being devoted to improvement of training facilities for guard personnel drills. Some people still feel an attachment to large, unwieldy guard duties training areas and to obsolete facilities, which hinders the conduct of combined drills prior to going on guard duty. And yet practical experience convinces us that the level of training facilities and adoption of modern training devices, making it possible comprehensively to prepare for standing guard duty, determine in large measure the quality of guard duty. The example of units which have accomplished a great deal in this area unquestionably merits extensive publicity."

Tactical Training Exercise Described

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Jul 81 p 1

[Article by Maj N. Goryachev: Steadfastness of an Assault Force"]

[Text] Emerging from behind the cloud cover, transport aircraft, carrying paratroopers on board, suddenly appeared over the battlefield, taking the "aggressor" by surprise. White canopies blossomed out in the sky overhead.

The first to touch down was a group of men under the command of Gds Sr Lt V. Grechishnikov. Its mission was to seize and hold the drop zone and to support the landing of the main forces.

Within minutes after the drop began, a paratrooper fighting vehicle bearing the hull number 033 was charging across the terrain, negotiating obstacles. Specialist 2d Class Gds Sgt A. Makarov had been the first to reach and begin unloading the BMD. The vehicle was headed toward the left corner of the drop zone, where the "aggressor" had mounted a headlong assault in an attempt to pin down the paratroop force. Fighting on the ground was in full swing. The paratroopers were stubbornly holding the bridgehead.

The roar of aircraft engines could be heard overhead. Paratrooper fighting vehicles, self-propelled guns, antiaircraft guns, ammunition, fuel, and rations were being dropped by cargo parachute, in short all equipment and supplies essential to an airborne assault force deep behind "aggressor" lines.

Taking advantage of confusion on the left flank, where the paratroopers had not yet deployed into combat formation, the "aggressor" mounted a tank counterattack. Gds Lt Col Ye. Semenov's men were about to have a rough time of it, but the artillerymen

came to their aid. Quickly taking up weapon positions, the men set the guns up for direct fire. The battery under the command of Gds Capt Sh. Akhmetov was the first to open fire on the tanks. The counterattack was beaten back through coordinated efforts. The paratroopers proceeded to capture and destroy the "aggressor" command post.

This was followed by a march across forested swampy terrain. The darkness of night and a thick fog proved to be staunch allies of the paratroopers. The "enemy" was operating aggressively along the routes. Setting up ambushes, he was attempting to prevent the paratroopers from reaching a tactically favorable line in a prompt and timely manner.

When a river was encountered in the assault force's path, the men of the engineer subunit under the command of Gds Capt P. M. Zaretskiy set to work. Bridge construction was directed by young party member Gds Lt Yu. Popov. The men worked skillfully and swiftly. When the head of the paratrooper main-force column emerged from the forest, traffic control service had already been set up by the bridge. The paratroopers reached the designated area on schedule.

At dawn the "aggressor" once again attempted to wipe out the assault force with a surprise attack. But this attempt was also unsuccessful. Advance and concealed occupation of a favorable position, skillful organization of defense and fire plan, the staunchness and pertinacity of the defending force prevented the attackers from gaining success. In addition, help soon reached the paratroopers. Another subunit was landed behind "aggressor" lines.

The skilled actions of the airborne troops were highly praised by Col Gen D. Sukhorukov, commander of airborne troops, who was present at the exercise. He noted the high degree of proficiency of the subunits, the initiative of the commanders, and their ability to act boldly, decisively, in close coordination with one another.

Accomplishment of these complex missions was promoted by well organized socialist competition in the subunits. In the summer period of training it is distinguished by a high level of intensity and innovativeness in the Airborne Troops. An intensive campaign to win and to surpass performance standards was also in evidence at the exercise. When tying down combat equipment on paradrop platforms, when un-lashing equipment, during assembly in the drop zone, during deployment into combat formation and when taking up weapon positions, and when setting up command posts -- everywhere the men were engaged in a campaign to gain seconds. In tying down combat equipment on paradrop platforms, for example, the subunits under the command of Gds Capt Sh. Akhmetov and Gds Sr Lt V. Luk'yanov did an excellent job. They were awarded pennants.

The paratroopers' actions at the tactical exercise were distinguished by courage, self-sacrifice and initiative. As he was about to touch down, Gds Pvt I. Perevozchikov was blown onto a power line by a heavy wind gust. A hazardous situation had developed. But the soldier did not lose his composure. Quickly releasing the harness, he jumped down to the ground and proceeded to carry out the mission together with his comrades.

Gds Jr Sgt M. Kalinnikov, commander of an excellent-rated artillery crew, injured his leg as he landed in a swamp. Saying nothing about it to anybody, he made his way to his gun and unlashed it himself. When his men arrived, the gun was already changed from traveling position to combat configuration. His crew was one of the first to open fire on the "aggressor" tanks. Guards Junior Sergeant Kalinnikov did a skillful job of directing his men. He did not report the injury until the engagement was ended.

...There is a poster on the grounds of the military post where the guards airborne troops are stationed. It bears the inscription "We shall continue and build upon the traditions of our fathers." And the unit has fine traditions. During the Great Patriotic War 50 members of the unit were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. The Airborne Troops are demonstrating with their selfless actions that the present generation of fighting men is worthily adding to the fame of past members of their unit.

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GROUND FORCES

RECONNAISSANCE TRAINING IN TRANSBAYKAL MILITARY DISTRICT

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 3, Feb 81 (signed to press 13 Jan 81) pp 9-10, 12-13

[Article by SOVETSKIY VOIN special correspondents Maj's B. Bobylev and I. Kurashov: "Cold Winds of the Transbaykal"]

[Text] In this region winter dusk falls 6 hours earlier than in Moscow. The sky, which a little while ago was a sparkling cornflower blue, swiftly darkens, and large, unwinking stars ignite one after the other. The triangular outlines of coniform hills, sparsely dotted with bristly larches, are clearly etched against the broad purple screen of sunset.

In the ringing, frosty air one can clearly hear the glassy crunching of the thin layer of snow being crushed by the soles of boots. Electric lamps light up in the barracks and other housing on the military post. Sr Lt Vladislav Shebalin smiles, stroking his moustache: he can distinguish even at a distance the friendly and mirthful voice of his reconnaissance scout. And not only by the dashing manner of execution of the military song....

Sr Sgt Viktor Nedogarok, deputy platoon commander, strides confidently into the somewhat cramped office, salutes smartly, and reports that the men have come from supper.

"The platoon is to proceed according to daily routine, and you and the squad leaders are to report to me in half an hour," the senior lieutenant ordered.

Two years ago Shebalin (at his insistent request) was made commander of a reconnaissance platoon. His superior gave it a good deal of thought before signing the orders. A graduate of the Tashkent Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni V. I. Lenin, Lieutenant Shebalin was in his third year as platoon commander in a motorized rifle company, had matured considerably, had become enriched with solid commander experience, and deserved promotion to company commander. But Shebalin himself felt that he could make the greatest contribution to the military in reconnaissance.

The lieutenant ran into the five-story apartment building where his family was quartered, swept up his wife and danced her around the room. His three-year-old son, named Aleksandr in honor of his grandfather, clasped his father's thick belt.

...A few hours ago Shebalin had stood before the assembled reconnaissance platoon, and every word spoken by his superior, who was presenting him, the new commander, to the men, was music to his ears. Then Shebalin had gazed intently into the faces of the reconnaissance personnel, endeavoring to determine the qualities of each on the basis of external indication -- first impressions are frequently correct. And the latter in turn, perhaps not as openly, but just as curiously and appraisingly scrutinized the strong-willed face of their new commander, noting his smart, athletic bearing. They would later learn that their platoon commander was rated first category in underwater swimming and second category in hockey, and they would not notice how unarmed combat would be taken up enthusiastically in the platoon under the influence of the young officer. They would learn that he is an excellent artist and wood carver, likes classical music and imaginative literature, especially on historical subjects. And of course each man would experience his stern temper and friendly compassion.

But everything began... with a failure. At the very first tactical exercise the platoon found itself in an extremely difficult situation, in which it was to make its way to a designated area deep in the "aggressor's" defense, locate and destroy a missile position there. As they approached their destination, Shebalin became increasingly nervous and lost his composure. At one of the waypoints he failed to note that he was following a wrong bearing. As a result the platoon failed to reach the proper grid square. At the post-exercise critique Shebalin naturally received a strong reprimand. He was extremely embarrassed and ashamed. But it was particularly hard for him to look his men in the eyes, men who had smoothly and skillfully achieved success at field exercises. At this difficult moment Shebalin found the inner strength to state openly and honestly that he was entirely to blame for the platoon's poor performance. He saw his men warm up, losing the icy air of distrust and alienation. "That's all right, Comrade Lieutenant, we'll get things right!" his second in command stated for all the men. This support inspired the commander and gained him everlasting affection for his men. In addition, it inspired trust in them, confidence in their capabilities -- precisely that which he had lacked at the very first exercise and which led him to a serious error.

And things proceeded to go well for the lieutenant, improving from one training class to the next, from exercise to exercise. Every training drill began and ended with military topography. Shebalin was as familiar with this science as the palm of his hand. While at service school he had learned to gain his bearings readily on any terrain, including desert, among sand dunes, with compass and map, night and day. And you can't trifle with the desert!

As they say, one man in the desert is not enough, even if he is a commander. As long as the platoon operated at full strength, everyone could count on the officer's help. But the situation frequently develops that a given squad may receive its own mission, and the sergeant, becoming commander of a self-contained team, must have the ability to operate independently deep in the "enemy's" defenses. And not only the sergeant. Every man must be able to operate independently.

And Shebalin carefully developed this in his noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel.

...The signal to assemble always has an alarming sound. The darkness of night still held the environs of the military post captive. Only the tops of the tallest hills

could be made out against the dark sky background when Shebalin, receiving his mission briefing, hurried off to the platoon area. The temperature was 30 degrees below zero Celsius, but Vladislav did not notice how his steamy breath was precipitating tiny bits of ice on his moustache and the collar of his sheepskin coat. This time their mission was an unusual one: to penetrate the "enemy's" dispositions by helicopter, to determine his numerical strength and weapons, and to capture a prisoner for interrogation. Their immediate task was to move out quickly to the designated pickup point, toward which the helicopters were already heading.

One of them is being flown by a young party member and pilot 1st class, Sr Lt Arkadiy Shtinnikov. A native of Arkhangel'skaya Oblast, he is proud of that great man from his native region, Mikhail Vasil'yevich Lomonosov, the first Russian Academician. Arkadiy's aircrew includes navigator Sr Lt Vladimir Fomin, a Komsomol member, and party member Sr Lt Yuriy Kuz'menko, the helicopter crew chief. The aircrew is experienced, functioning smoothly and with excellence.

The five blades of the main motor slice the frosty air of the Transbaykal, cautiously and swiftly bringing closer the vehicle, designated in pilot's jargon by the short and familiar word "bort," to the point of rendezvous with Shebalin's reconnaissance platoon. A flashlight signal winked from the ground below -- the prearranged signal! Shtinnikov peered at his map and brought the helicopter down. The recon scouts nimbly climbed aboard, Shebalin and Shtinnikov shook hands, and the "bort," its engine roaring, headed off along the designated route. Some time later the platoon commander looked at his watch, while the pilot looked at the clock on the instrument panel: the minute hands indicated the same number of minutes to landing. The helicopter hovered 2 or 3 meters above the ground, the door opened, and the recon scouts disappeared into the darkness.

The practice jumps from a truck came in handy here! Shebalin, believing that every recon scout should be agile, decided to teach his men to jump from a moving truck. First he explained and demonstrated how it should be done. The men gazed intently: 20, 30, 40, 50 kilometers per hour, and he would jump off the truck as coolly as you please. He would tighten into a ball, do three or four forward rolls, get up and calmly brush off the dust.

"A personal example? Yes, a personal example! Don't worry, nobody got hurt, and now they jump as well as I do," related Shebalin. "And they tumble onto the 'enemy' like snowballs."

The helicopter headed back, hastening to make its way through the gap in the "enemy's" dispositions, while the recon scouts hurriedly departed from the landing spot. Not relying on the saying "God helps those who help themselves," but purely following a professional habit, which had become a part of their very being: to see everything while remaining unseen, to hear while operating silently. Putting out men on the point and flanks, Shebalin led his platoon toward a hill which was gradually becoming more visible. They would have a better view of the terrain from the hilltop.

They reached the hill. The point reported that the hill was clear of "enemy." Shebalin clambered up the rocky scree. The platoon clambered up behind him. Shebalin and all his men were well aware that a single careless movement could send

a small stone downslope, causing a rockslide, which would not only reveal the platoon's presence with its noise but would also sweep the platoon to the bottom of the hill. What's more, a rock shower can be dangerous, if one considers that some of the "droplets" weigh up to 70 pounds or more.

Shebalin froze and raised his arm: "Attention!" Without turning around, he swept both arms outward to the sides. The men responded to their commander's arm signal and cautiously deployed into staggered formation. The rest was a matter of technique -- the training class drills had produced the desired effect. They reached the top of the hill without complications, immediately set up an observation post, and set up the radio. Some time later they proceeded to radio information on "enemy" truck and tank column movements.

Shebalin likes to repeat: "What is new? Frequently the new is the well forgotten old." And this is why. The men of the platoon frequently discuss and group-analyze movies and works of fiction about actual recon scouts during the Great Patriotic War. Fearlessness, bravery, ingenuity, agility and keen-wittedness displayed by their fathers and grandfathers -- all these qualities are being acquired by young people. An atmosphere of confidence and trust has formed in the platoon, a sense of a single, unified family, and fine, moving platoon traditions have also become established.

Frequently one or another of the men receives a parcel from his parents. The contents -- candy, fruit, vegetables, cigarettes -- are evenly divided among all the men. And this warms the commander's heart, who instilled pure, selfless friendship in his men.

"It cannot be any other way," Pvt Aleksandr Vlasov stated to us with conviction, and continued: "I noted that on halts one of the men or another would start talking about his republic or oblast and that the fellows would listen with interest. I talked with the platoon commander, and now we hold such talks in the Lenin Room, only not improvised discussions, but rather talks which are prepared in advance. Sr Sgt V. Nedogorob told about his native Poltava, Pvt B. Nomokonov about Yakutia, and Jr Sgt M. Abdurakhmanov about Uzbekistan. We now have a tradition: each newcomer to the platoon tells about himself and about his native region. The men listen and become permeated with a deeper feeling of responsibility for the fate of the entire country, a feeling of a single, unified family."

...Toward evening Shebalin received orders to send out several reconnaissance teams in different directions, and he was to lead one of them personally. The commander assigned missions to his sergeants with a confident voice. "No questions? Let's move out!"

The route followed by Shebalin's team crossed a road. They stopped and observed. "Comrade Lieutenant," whispered Jr Sgt V. Bol'dt, "ambush." Shebalin had also spotted the "enemy" concealed in a ravine, and estimated the situation: "We can fight our way through, but why give ourselves away?" A truck was traveling swiftly along the road. It was throwing up a cloud of snow particles, which hung in the air and slowly settled. Shebalin looked at his watch and again fixed the time. "15 seconds. Plenty of time to cross the road without being seen," decided Shebalin.

A small column of vehicles noisily approached, and as soon as it had passed by, the recon scouts dashed across the road. Pvt S. Fomin was running alongside Shebalin. He had changed unrecognizably -- he was performing nimbly and with agility. When he reported for duty to the platoon, all the men were amazed: "The lad has shoulders that won't quit, can bend a poker into a pretzel, but he is rather weak on the horizontal bar." Pvt A. Vlasov, a first-category athlete in both freestyle and Greco-Roman wrestling, Pvt V. Kremer, a first-category athlete in unarmed combat, Pvt I. Levchenko, a first-category athlete in boxing and skiing, and Sr Lt V. Nedogarok, a candidate master of sport and district boxing champion, worked with him. The platoon commander also worked with him, but results were not forthcoming. Shebalin proceeded to work from a different direction, using psychology. He led Fomin up to the horizontal bar, showed him how to do a pullover, and commanded Sergey: "Mount the bar!" The latter hung on the bar and tried to chin himself up, but could not.... His fingers turned white and were about to lose their grip.

Shebalin said to him: "You are hanging over a gorge, and you must deliver important information to your commanding officer. Get moving!" Fomin just hung there, and fell onto the mat. Shebalin, displeased, shrugged his shoulders and went back to the office. Some time later there was a knock on the door. Fomin entered and addressed him from the threshold: "Transfer me out of here, Comrade Lieutenant. I won't make a recon scout."

They had a long talk that evening, and Shebalin convinced the young soldier that strength also requires technique and agility, and most important -- faith in oneself. The entire platoon instilled faith in Fomin, and things started improving! Today his performance is outstanding!

Shebalin's party penetrated deeper into the "enemy's" defense. They climbed to the top of another hill and, right there before their very eyes, stood three large tents and a small, headquarters tent. Pvt V. Kremer has a correct grasp of his duties as platoon agitator -- in such cases he displays a personal example. He and Private Fomin formed a "snatch" team, and silently crawled toward a sentry. A brief struggle and the sentry was taken out.

It seemed that they had a clear path to the tents. But suddenly they heard footsteps. They looked around: the commander of the guard, accompanied by the member of the guard, was checking the sentry posts. They instantly made a decision. For some reason the commander of the guard had fallen behind. This played right into the hands of Kremer and Fomin. Shebalin crawled up noiselessly: "We'll capture headquarters and take a prisoner for interrogation!"

Campfires were burning, flinging sparks into the frosty sky. Everything was quiet in the camp. They reached the headquarters tent. Shebalin switched on his flashlight -- a bright beam of light blinded the sentry. They quickly stripped maps and other headquarters documents from a table.

Somewhat later we learned that the other parties of Shebalin's reconnaissance platoon had performed just as resourcefully and boldly. They all accomplished their complex missions with a mark of excellent, once again confirming that it is for good reason that the platoon has borne the title of excellent for two years now.

The recon scouts can learn a great deal from their commander. At every exercise he reveals new abilities.

"Every soldier likes to shoot," Shebalin said in a conversation with me, and a boyish smile lit up his intelligent face, sly highlights dancing in his pupils. At first my men could not believe their ears when I announced to them that I would not give them any peace until I taught each and every one of them to shoot a pistol, machinegun, grenade launcher, and antiaircraft machinegun. And naturally the assault rifle. This really infused the men with enthusiasm! And now almost every-one of them is a skilled marksman with all small arms."

Here you have him, Senior Lieutenant Shebalin, commander of an excellent-rated reconnaissance platoon. One can understand why Jr Sgt Vladimir Bol'dt put it so simply and precisely: "We are strong because there are no weak men -- weak physically or in spirit -- in the platoon." Yes, with such lads one can state in full truth that every man would go on a reconnaissance mission without an instant's hesitation.

The commander is confident in his recon scouts, and the men are confident in their commander. It is for this reason that they achieve, working together, excellent results in combat and political training.

The recon scouts have taken a rapid pace in socialist competition to honor the 26th CPSU Congress. At a Komsomol meeting they revised their pledges, adopting more difficult, tougher ones. Observing their performance at tactical exercises and their attitude toward military service in large things and small, we have reached the conclusion that when the recon scouts give their word, they mean it.

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NAVAL FORCES

SURFACE VESSELS: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

ASW Ship: Navigator Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jun 81 p 2

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank A. Bobrakov: "Tactic Dictate"]

[Text] One of the new officers was taking the test for authorization to control the ship independently. The flag specialists took turns examining him. The flag navigator was entirely satisfied with the officer's knowledge of navigation. The flag missile specialist gave him a high score for progress in the study of missile weapons. And the flag engineer took special note of the fact that the officer was able to cite highly complex formulas from memory. It was true that the design of the ship for which the officer was being tested was such that these formulas would hardly be useful. But in the opinion of the flag mechanic his knowledge of them illustrated a breadth of outlook.

But then came the time to check how well this officer who was taking the authorization exams could use his vast knowledge of the theory and layout of the ship, its weapons, and its equipment in practice, in training battles. A series of inputs was used to create a situation approximating that of combat. The situation demanded that he quickly find answers to a number of difficult questions: "How can you tell what missiles the enemy will use to strike the ship? How much time will the commander have to adopt a plan when the missile is in view? How will he use the weapons and equipment in this situation and in case the missile hits the ship?"

Unfortunately, he did not have clear-cut answers this time. The officer mixed up the order of his commands and adopted an incorrect maneuvering plan.

It was, as the saying goes, the same old story. On the one hand the man's knowledge was quite substantial. But on the other hand, he had weaknesses among the things that would be needed in battle.

Why do these difficult situations sometimes occur? I believe it is because certain staffs sometimes permit omissions in the methodology of training ship commanders.

We often say that the ship commander must be, to coin a phrase, the "first navigator." The commander of a missile ship must be the "first missileman."

Certainly it would be good in principle if the commander were also the "first engineer," "first chemical specialist," or "first communications officer." A knowledge of the ship and all the equipment that it has is extremely essential to the commander.

But let us look at this from the other side. Suppose that the officer, for example like the one discussed above, has studied navigation, the missile complex, and the power plant and mastered the other ship systems. Will this be enough for him to be considered a mature ship commander? No, the arithmetic sum of specialized knowledge in different fields is inadequate. For he must still learn the main thing, to command a ship in battle, think in tactical terms, and adopt plans that lead the crew to victory. This means that what the commander needs is not simply a sum of knowledge, but rather an integration of knowledge and skills with due regard for tactical requirements. This should be the starting point for the flag officer and all staff officers regardless of what specialization they represent.

The flag officer [flagman] should set the tone in this difficult work. The regulations say unambiguously that the unit commander must personally train the ship commanders directly subordinate to him. Everything is important in this, the flag officer's personal training, his level of methodological skill, and even his temperament. Some emphasize immediate problems, while others think with greater perspective. After all, a missile launch may be viewed as a definite technological cycle, but it must be considered a key element in battle. Staff officers are very sensitive to the flag officer's criteria, and if the criteria are strict and the staff as a whole emphasizes the interests of combat readiness, then the training of ship commanders will be clear-cut and purposeful.

In my opinion, the example of Capt-Lt I. Vdovin, a former staff communications officer who is now a successful teacher at the Naval Academy, is instructive on this level. Like others, he used to be most concerned about his own work area. When helping ship commanders study communications equipment, he worked, in principle, to make each one of them be "first communications officer" in the crew in terms of knowledge. But the attractive thing was how he did it. He did not simply broaden the scope of specialized knowledge or try to increase the number of training hours. He took the path of intensification, tried to concentrate the training of the commanders on practical necessities, and taught everything in a tactical setting: how the ship commander would use the communications equipment at his disposal in an actual combat situation.

Vdovin also did a great deal of work to identify and introduce new and progressive developments that appeared for using communications equipment on cruises and exercises. He literally "advertised" these innovations on ships, gave them to the commanders, and helped them use the equipment more efficiently.

The steady development of equipment and weapons leads to a situation where the ship commander, whose duties are already very broad, simply cannot master everything in all of the fields of knowledge that are essential to him. That is why it is extremely important for him to learn the essence of them, and this should be an essence with a clear tactical orientation.

I remember an occasion several years ago when I, a new ship commander at the time, had to study one of the types of missiles with the other ship commanders. Staff specialists worked on this question with us for a long time. It appeared that we had it down fairly well. But then one of the designers came to the unit. He held just one training period with us, one hour long. But I believe that we received more in that one training period than in all the previous weeks. Why? It was because the staff officers who conducted the training periods kept pouring on material, hoping that in time the most important and essential things would define themselves. But the designer, who is both a competent specialist and a skilled methodologist, was highly informative and right to the point. He talked about the importance of the functioning of particular parts of the missile for effective use in combat and what opportunities we, the commanders, could derive for tactical creativity. This meeting with the designer forced me to rethink many things. Several new tactical procedures were developed in the unit later.

Now certainly flag specialists and staff officers could inspire ship commanders in a similar way. I believe that they could do it if they themselves took a creative attitude toward the work.

Unfortunately, some of our staff officers lack precisely this investigative approach to problems. One time we were planning an exercise and ran into a question that demanded an innovative, fundamentally new approach. It offered staff specialist Capt-Lt V. Kalinin a chance to show creativity and make a new kind of calculations for missile use. If he had, probably one of the ship commanders at sea would have elaborated the idea and a new tactical procedure might have been born. But Kalinin could not break away from the conventional alternative. The exercise went smoothly, but, of course, it could have been much more productive.

Teach the commander to think, to create victory in battle. Slogans alone are not enough for this. This kind of training needs appropriate forms and methods. In my opinion, a careful analysis of the entire arsenal of commander training must be made from time to time to bring it into line with actual requirements.

What we need today is not so much the commander's ability to memorize a mass of information, as his ability to think. What we need is not so much tests of his memory as tests of his ability to be creative in battle. This is where the methodological search must go on. Then the effectiveness of commander training will rise steadily.

Take this, for instance. We used to conduct complex three-hour course plotting sessions to test the navigation training of the commanders. Then on the recommendation of higher headquarters we replaced them with short, 30-minute sessions. The quality of the training did not suffer at all; it actually improved. This was because these 30-minute plotting sessions, unlike the longer sessions used earlier, concentrated attention on the main things, those with which the ship commander at sea and in training battle must deal.

My basic subject here has been the role of the staff in training ship commanders. But it is obvious that no matter how well the staff may work, if the commander himself does not strive toward knowledge and creativity, it will all be

ineffective. The true commander does not wait until the staff specialist arrives on board ship and teaches him something. He himself goes to the specialist. This is precisely what Captain 3rd Rank A. Reutov and V. Pilat do, for example. And it is especially valuable that these leading commanders, when consulting with staff officers on various specialized questions and carefully absorbing their answers, always find time to test them at sea, during combat training, and if possible they elaborate them on the tactical level. This kind of creative, enterprising approach conforms to the demands of the 26th Congress of the CPSU concerning working style and leads inevitably to success in performing combat training missions and to growth in commander skill.

Sub Hunting Trainer

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jun 81 p 2

[Article by Maj L. Bleskin: "Multipurpose Trainer"]

[Text] The submarine maneuvered skillfully and the ASW ship simply could not complete the attack. When it seemed that success was finally very close, the enemy suddenly started jamming and created new difficulties for the ASW ships.

This battle did not take place at sea, but rather in a new classroom. Amateur efficiency enthusiasts Captains 3rd Rank G. Donets and L. Savin and Warrant Officers [Michmany] G. Balanda, V. Abramkin, and S. Mikushin developed a multipurpose trainer which provides excellent practice in cooperation between mixed forces during the hunt for a submarine, tracking it, and attacking it. The trainer allows changing the hydrology of the sea and jamming communications channels during the drill and simulating every possible kind of active enemy countermeasures, including the use of weapons. The progress of the hunt and the duels that arise are projected on a movie screen. A videorecorder makes it possible to reproduce the situation on television.

The commanders of ASW ships like the innovation. During the summer training period they will make full use of the trainer to insure high quality in-base training for ASW crews so that they can accomplish their missions effectively at sea later.

Support Ship: on the 'Ivan Kucherenko'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jun 81 p 2

[Article by Captain 1st Rank G. Savichev, "Then, in the Middle of the Pacific"]

[Text] We were sailing in the Pacific, the greatest of the world's oceans. It is difficult to picture its size; after all, the Pacific Ocean occupies half the surface area of the planet.

Day after day and week after week the base ship Ivan Kucherenko continued to cut the horizon with its sharp stem, but the ocean did not end. We left the Tsugaru Strait behind and the remarkably lovely Hawaiian Islands melted into the

ocean behind. Five or 10 million years ago volcanoes raised these islands out of the ocean depths to the surface, and now they have stretched in a chain more than 3,000 kilometers long like a green necklace on the boundless blue.

Incidentally, there is perhaps nowhere else in the world that has such a blue color as the middle Pacific. The blue there is blinding, pure, and primal. Perhaps everything blue in the world came from there. Another surprising thing was that we met very few ships in many days of sailing. The ocean was generally deserted.

But things were moving fast on board the ship. It was a training cruise. The cadets of the Pacific Ocean Higher Naval School imeni S. O. Makarov were receiving practical training on this ship. That is why there were training periods and drills from morning until late in the evening. And in the evening, when the sun had disappeared behind the horizon, cadets armed with sextants poured out onto the upper deck and bridges. Then in the silence of twilight, disturbed only by the light splashing of the waves and the whisper of the constellations, voices rang out calling "Ready!" and "Zero!" To determine the position of the ship by stellar bodies the cadets used the sextants to measure the altitude of the stars.

Captain 1st Rank Aleksandr Nikolayevich Sakharov, a teacher from the school serving as acting navigator during the cruise, usually directed these training periods. He is a calm, thoughtful man with a vast amount of experience.

He did not acquire his know-how all at once. Sakharov has been on many long cruises, in the Arctic Ocean, the Atlantic, the Indian, and the Pacific. Everywhere he has gone he has learned new, useful things. This did not happen without difficulty either; but as Aleksandr Nikolayevich recalls, the first steps were the most difficult.

He graduated from the Makarov School also, in 1950. He was immediately appointed to an important position, navigator on the destroyer Vnezapnyy. Before he was able to become accustomed to his job the destroyer was ordered to go to sea. Before its departure the flag navigator came on board ship to see what the new specialist was like. He examined Sakharov for knowledge of the latest navigation documents and sailing directions and checked his chart corrections. In conclusion he said to the commander, "On a five-point system your navigator's knowledge would score about 1.7. I would not go to sea with such a navigator."

"But I don't have anyone else," the commander objected reasonably.

"I will have to go with you then," the flag navigator said, sighing. It was plain that the prospect did not excite him.

During the cruise he never let up on Sakharov. He made him determine the ship's position numerous times by different methods and watched closely to see how he kept up the necessary documents and how he managed his subordinates, the helmsmen and navigation electricians. Sakharov barely managed to rest during

the cruise, but the knowledge he had received at school and had not been able to demonstrate well to the flag navigator because of nervousness, gradually became reinforced in him and assumed a practical foundation.

As they were returning to base a very dense fog fell suddenly. They could not even see the jack-staff on the bow of the destroyer. The question came up: Should they head into base or wait until the fog dispersed? But the fog might last weeks.

"What is your advice, flag navigator?" the commander asked.

He shrugged his shoulders. But Sakharov, suddenly getting up courage, said, "I believe we can make it in, comrade commander. I guarantee you we can go right through the boom gate."

And so the destroyer set off at its slowest speed, blanketed in fog, moving in the direction of the booms. Would it make it through or not? The slightest inaccuracy could cause a navigation accident. Now and again the commander looked at his navigator and one could tell that he was just about to order the ship to stop. But at this moment the forward watch reported: "We are going through the boom gate. We are going through cleanly!"

When the flag navigator left the ship he said to Sakharov, "In general I would give you a '4.' But don't get conceited."

I remembered this story one evening when our ship had already passed Hawaii. As usual, the cadets were learning to determine their position by the stars and, as usual, Aleksandr Nikolayevich was directing them. I thought to myself, "Here is a graphic example of the eternal succession. Once he was taught, and now he is teaching."

"There is Mars," said Sakharov. And on the right side is the constellation of the Bull. It is a shame that the horizon is a little blurred. But never mind, it should clear up. Now there is Cassiopeia. Do you recognize it?"

"We know it," the cadets answered. And then one of them said, "It would be nice to discover something new."

"Work hard, gather knowledge, keep at it, keep looking," Sakharov responded. "And then you will make discoveries."

Probably Aleksandr Nikolayevich did not expect that his words would shortly sound prophetic. During its training cruise the Ivan Kucherenko was supposed to visit three countries, the Port of Valparaiso in Chile, the Port of Callao in Peru, and the Port of Guayaquil in Ecuador. The situation in Peru and Ecuador was calm and stable, but as for Chile, while we were still at sea our radio began to receive more and more alarming news. Reactionaries were provoking disorder in the country, attempting to discredit and even overthrow the Salvador Allende government.

That is why we were listening to reports from Chile with special concern and worry. And when it was announced one day that Salvador Allende, the ardent patriot of his country and a man of remarkable charm, had been killed all the participants in the cruise experienced profound grief. A political meeting was held that very day. Speeches were given at it, filled with hatred of the fascists. We honored Allende's memory with a minute of silence.

Of course, there could now be no question of a visit to Chile. But what would happen to the schedule of the training cruise? It was fairly rigid. The schedule had envisioned five days in Valparaiso, and the crew needed them for rest.

"We will have to put down anchor," said flag navigator Sakharov.

"But where?" exclaimed Vice Admiral Boris Nikolayevich Potekhin, the commanding officer on the cruise. "I don't see any shallows nearby."

Indeed we were on the high seas and it was a long way to shallow water. The ship stood in at least 4,000 meters of water, perhaps more. You cannot put down anchor at such a depth. Something like 100 meters would be more like it.

"Give me an hour to think," Aleksandr Nikolayevich said. He took his sailing directions, references, and charts of various scales and started studying. Soon he reported to the admiral that there should be nearby a shallow place or, as sailors call it, a "bank," a distinctive place much shallower than the general depth of the ocean. It was a very small one, but large enough for the ship to hold at anchor there.

"The character of the changes in depth indicates that there is an underwater peak somewhere here," Sakharov reported. "And the sailing directions also mention it. They add, though, that the position of this peak is not definitely known."

"Maybe there isn't one at all," the admiral said. "Or maybe it is 50 miles to the right or left. We can't spend a month searching for it."

Sakharov spread out his chart in front of the commander, "I know the necessary calculations and outlined a search plan. I think we will find the bank." Then the long, tiring hours of searching began. The ship changed course again and again. First it would turn to the right, and then to the left strictly following the plan made up by Sakharov. The acoustic depth finder was on constantly and everyone in the wheelhouse kept watching its tape. But the depths it showed were not what we wanted; 5,000, 4,700, 5,200 and so on.

The longer the search went on, the more swiftly our hopes melted. Many no longer believed that we would be successful in finding the bank. And that is no surprise — just try to find, for example, an object the size of a pinhead on a soccer field. This was the approximate difficulty of the problem the navigator group was trying to solve.

The depth continued as before: 5,000, 4,000, then again 5,000. A depression was growing, the ship desperately needed to stop for a short time and give the men a rest. Such is so necessary after a long trip.

The depth was 5,300, 4,000, 3,000, and then a general cry went up: "45!"

The commander immediately cut the engine and put the ship in reverse. The anchor chain knocked on the side, meaning that it had hit bottom. After a minute the bos'un reported: "180 meters on the hawsehole!"

Sakharov took a pencil and marked the narrow definitely ascertained point: "You could perhaps say that we discovered a new bank."

"Well then, we'll have to name it," the admiral said, smiling. "I propose calling it Sakharov bank."

That is exactly what they named it.

ASW Ship: Training on the 'Obraztsovyy'

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jun 81 p 1

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank A. Shkurkin, Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet: "The 'Obraztsovyy' Attacks"]

[Text] The command "Begin sonar watch" rang out and the large ASW ship "Obraztsovyy" started performance of the important mission of searching for and destroying an 'enemy' submarine. It was not an easy day for the hunt; hydrologic conditions were complex. This was the result of a recent storm that had fully mixed the water layers. The difficulty of the work was increased by the fact that the underwater 'enemy', according to the conditions of the exercise, had very extensive maneuvering capability.

All these things forced the ship ASW team to work at maximum intensity. The sonarmen had to be especially attentive, of course.

PO 2nd Class V. Zaborilo, specialist 1st Class, was on duty at the sonar station. He carefully sounded the depths and had to report to the command post again and again that there were no targets in sight. But then in the chaos of underwater noise the petty officer detected something unique. After his report to the ship commander the men of the combat information post and the navigator got to work. Their joint efforts aimed at one thing, to classify the target exactly. In a short time they concluded that it was a false contact, mere noise. Everything had to begin over again.

But it should be emphasized that even this moment in the exercise demonstrated the fighting mood of the ASW men. They classified the contact quickly and accurately, and that is very important. If you waste precious minutes working with a false target, the real target — the submarine, may slip by unnoticed.

Before departing out to sea the men had devoted special attention to precisely this element of ASW training: quick and accurate classification of the contact. A great deal of time was spent by the full ship ASW team working on a special trainer in the classroom. They also used the training technique of working through

actions at battle positions extensively. Competition to surpass combat standards was organized in all elements of the team.

WO V. Gamotskiy, an experienced specialist and master of military affairs, achieved the best results of the sonarmen. And he was the one at the sonar during the tensest moments of the hunt. The warrant officer did not simply listen to the depths. He worked like a master, a virtuoso, using different search techniques, changing bands, and adjusting the amplification. This kind of active work produced results: contact!

The exact data transmitted by Warrant Officer Gamotskiy to the main command post and combat information posts made it possible to establish that this time it was a target, a submarine, in the scan sector. The ship commander adopted a plan to attack it.

The 'enemy' sensed the danger and maneuvered vigorously, changing bearing and speed, and using every possible trick. Suddenly several signals of almost identical brightness appeared on the screen at once, as if the target had broken into pieces. But this did not fool the experienced Warrant Officer Gamotskiy. He identified the true target by a subtle shade of brightness that the untrained eye would not see. Again he transmitted confident reports to the main command post: "The echo bearing is...Distance is..."

At the same time the men of the torpedo department commanded by Capt-Lt V. Khudyakov were completing weapons preparations. Precise information for depth charge bombing was prepared. The tube was aimed.

"Fire!"

Leaving behind trails of fire and smoke, the rocket bombs sped away for the targets, one after another. High plumes of water rose up at the point where they fell.

After a short time the ASW men learned that the enemy had been destroyed. They had performed their mission outstandingly.

AA Training, Radar Operators

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jun 81 p 2

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank V. Morozov, ship commander: "Aiming at the Final Results"]

[Text] The recent training battle was very successful for the crew of our ship. The men of the missile department worked brilliantly and were able to destroy three low-flying high-speed targets with three missiles.

I would go so far as to say that this achievement was a predetermined result of the entire course of training and competition, in particular of competition based on missions and standards.

The radar operators detected one of the targets simulating enemy missiles several kilometers before the line that marked the outstanding standard. As a result the teams had several "extra" seconds to work out the target indications. And in battle it is often seconds that are decisive. And that is why Sr Lt V. Nosikov, deputy ship commander for political affairs, emphasized these seconds saved when he was speaking on the loud speakers right after the battle about those who had distinguished themselves. One of the men he named was Sr Lt V. Shorokhov, commander of the electronics division. I could not help recalling the start of the long cruise.

We had taken steps to see that competition based on missions and standards started right at the start of the cruise. We had prepared the Party and Komsomol organizations and the officers and warrant officers for this. But things did not get under way well right at the start.

On one occasion I was inspecting a drill for radar operators conducted by Sr Lt V. Shorokhov. Some of the specialists were not meeting the standards. I advised Shorokhov to conduct his drills at a more intensive pace and to fill them with competitive aspects. I added that he could always count on my help, especially because I had once commanded a ship radar service.

The intensity of radar operator drills increased. Shorokhov tried to pack them with unexpected inputs which would demand a knowledge of all the technical capabilities of the radar and an ability to use them. Before performing each mission the seamen adopted concrete obligations and indicated exactly what results they intended to achieve in performance of the particular standards. The seconds saved were hard to come by, but each success was noticed. The leaders in competition were commended and activists told about them in radio broadcasts.

We must admit that at first some of the men in BCh-5, the engineering department, were not fulfilling the standards either, especially those relating to damage control. Department commander Capt 3rd Rank Engineer V. Tverdovskiy had to work hard to create an atmosphere of healthy competition in military labor. As an experienced methodologist he watched carefully to see that increasing the pace of the work did not infringe on the quality of performance and to make each specialist see the direct connection between the results of the present drill and the quality of work on the real equipment during training battle.

Competition to perform each mission and standard outstandingly gradually became an inalienable part of ship life. For example, the entire crew was interested in the struggle between the batteries commanded by Senior Lieutenants A. Chugunov and V. Yanovich for the right to fire missiles.

Both of the batteries distinguished themselves in the training battle, but I particularly want to note Sr Lt A. Chugunov. One target after another came with minimum intervals between. The battery commander literally had just seconds. This is where the effects of ocean training and vigorous competition were felt.

Victory is gratifying, of course, but we must not overlook shortcomings. The dynamic and heightened quality of competition based on missions and norms which was

so effective during the ocean cruise is something we have not always achieved during short trips to sea. Capt Lt L. Sirotin, commander of the control department, deserves a real reprimand because he does not take care to see that the competitive atmosphere reigns on every day of summer combat training.

The more quickly the shortcomings in training and competition can be overcome, the more confident we will be that the crew of the ship will not only fulfill but overfulfill the lofty socialist obligations it assumed in the year of the 26th party congress. Our seamen are laboring with their sights on this final result which, of course, they see as the way to furthering ship combat readiness.

Analysis of Training Results

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jul 81 p 2

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Dobrovol'skiy, officer of the Main Naval Staff: "The Usefulness of the Review"]

[Text] Capt 2nd Rank A. Il'in, commander of a subunit of ships, was reviewing a drill with the ship commanders and staff officers. Thorough preparations had been made for the drill. Formulation of the mission, development of the commander's plan, and preliminary instructions had all followed accepted methodology. During the drill, however, we saw imprecise control and confused reports and the standards for going through the commands and reports were not always maintained.

It was expected that the review would answer the main questions: Exactly who had made the mistakes, in what and why? And, what would each participant in the drill have to do to avoid a repetition of these mistakes? Unfortunately, the men attending the review heard mostly about the first question. Those who permitted breakdowns and carelessness were named. But the quality of the analysis left much to be desired.

If the review was unsuccessful and did not prove instructive, we may say that it did damage. After all, any training activity, whether it is a ship going out to sea or an officer drill in a room on shore, involves expenditures of material-technical resources and the time and efforts of many specialists. There must be a return on this in the form of improved skills. This improvement depends greatly on a review organized in conformity with controlling documents and methodological recommendations. The review is a training measure. To reduce it to a simple announcement of scores or a session in which the flag officer demonstrates his dissatisfaction with poor work, which unfortunately sometimes happens, is to lose the enormous potential that the review offers.

Let us return to the review mentioned above. The officers on whom the quality of performance of combat training missions largely depend are assembled. They are supposed to know the senior officer's expectations on the basic questions of combat training, but these expectations themselves must rely on controlling documents. But in this particular case Capt 2nd Rank A. Il'in was unclear about

the correct way to organize command post drills. He did not follow the schedule of drills recommended by the documents. At the review he should have clearly identified not only particular, but also general causes of the breakdowns in control and outlined ways to eliminate shortcomings. In fact, however, the reviews were nothing but particulars, listing off isolated mistakes.

The participants in the review left with a nagging feeling of confusion: exactly where were they expected to begin working to eliminate these shortcomings. This is a true indicator that this review did not accomplish its main training purpose. After all, any commander returning to his own ship must conduct a particular review with the commanders of the departments and chiefs of services, relying on the points and conclusions given in the review by the senior officer. The subunit commanders, in their turn, take these evaluations to all personnel, analyzing the contribution of each team and each specialist to the overall combat work. But if the initial analysis is unclear, what kind of clarity can there be later on?

Officers learn the role of the review from their first days in the service by observing their superiors and their know-how. Their attitude toward the review is formed by the demands which senior officers make of them, attempting to develop their ability to analyze, self-critical level, principles, and methodological skill.

We have very rich traditions in this area. During the Great Patriotic War every trip by a ship to perform a combat mission was scrupulously reviewed. This produced tangible combat results. This is sufficiently demonstrated by the improvement in the accuracy of gunfire against shore targets during combat operations in the Baltic and Black Seas and the success of torpedo attacks by submariners of the Northern Sea as the result of careful analysis and outlining steps to improvement. In his memoirs Rear Adm I. Kolyshkin, Hero of the Soviet Union, describes how carefully the first combat attack by a submarine in the Northern Fleet, commanded by Officer A. Moiseyev, was analyzed. The Shch-401 entered a fjord, fired a torpedo, but the transport was not damaged. Why? They reviewed carefully, changed the combat instructions on setting the traveling depth of the torpedo, and this produced an effective combat result. On its next mission the Shch-401 scored its first victim by torpedoing a fascist ship.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that many aspects of the work of the flag officer and staff and the quality of training and indoctrination given to ship commanders can be judged correctly by the quality of reviews. I have attended many reviews conducted or prepared by Officer V. Goncharuk. They have been devoted to both successful and not entirely successful training activities. What is distinctive is that every review session has left a feeling of satisfaction at the depth of analysis of the situation and the convincing nature of the evaluations and conclusions.

The means to accomplish this are readily available. The entire course of events can be traced on the basis of objective monitoring data (time-and-motion studies, photographs, tape recordings, duty logs, and the like). The

actions of each ship are analyzed in terms of key tactical elements. If a mistake has been made, the mechanism of its occurrence is revealed. At the conclusion of the review the ship commanders and staff are given assignments, problematic matters are formulated, and attention is called to the specific know-how of the leaders. By the time that the scores are announced those present have a clear idea of why the flag officers give precisely these scores.

The general procedure cannot, of course, convey the originality inherent in each particular review (especially the uniqueness of its moral-psychological climate), but in this case it is significant to note what is distinctive and methodologically valid. We will observe one more thing also, Officer V. Goncharuk approaches reviews of training activities from clear-cut objective standpoints. This is extremely important. There are examples in practice where flag officers construct the review around the result achieved. If the aerial target was shot down or the submarine was detected and attacked, the review has a positive tone and shortcomings are not mentioned. Or it may be the other way around. The result is that sometimes such important matters as the nature of tactical maneuvering, the range of weapons, and the like are left in the shadows.

In such cases objectivity suffers, and it is absolutely essential in order to choose the best course in the future. One can feel the lack of substance at superficial, formalistic reviews. Instead of a consistent examination of the foundations of each report and plan and instead of identifying the logic of events, those present are served up a schematic picture that has been deliberately shaped to fit the result. But the result, even though it does have great hypothetical training value, must not, figuratively speaking, be either the forgiveness of sins or a whip with which to beat those who were not successful.

During a submarine hunt, just when the control time was about to run out, the ASW men were able to detect and attack the target. They were saved by a complete accident, but at the review this was presented as a component part of the practical plan. Here is another example. An aerial target was shot down while repulsing an air attack on a group of ships. But at the review there was not a word about shortcomings that were revealed during the firing. Obviously, such a review is not very useful.

Ship commanders try to learn tactical perspective and navigation know-how from their flag officers, but unfortunately they do not all pay attention to the ability of their senior officers to analyze the course of combat training on the ship or in the unit. Then one fine day the ship commander is appointed to a higher position which demands this skill, but he does not have it and then must hurry to make up for what he missed. Those commanders who in performing combat training missions usually devote their primary attention to the techniques of firing and hunting for submarines at the expense of tactical analysis have the hardest time reorienting themselves. With this approach the review of training battle, which should be considered above all from the standpoint of a truly possible combat situation, often becomes a shower of details on preparing the weapons for use.

Those ship commanders who focus attention on tactics and the actual readiness of the crew for battle are much more far-sighted. One specific way they do this is by improving the methodology of reviewing exercises and cruises. Capt 3rd Rank L. Shevchenko has not been commanding a ship for long, but he has already made it outstanding. I attended some of his reviews and could see that they had been carefully and objectively prepared. In them I could see the same style that I saw in the reviews conducted by Officer Goncharuk. One thing is no wonder. Shevchenko tries to learn from the older men things that will be valuable for the work. In the same unit there are commanders with greater experience and time in the service than Shevchenko. Nonetheless, their reviews suffer from many omissions and deviations from the principles of the controlling documents. Therefore, the important thing is a desire to learn and an understanding of the importance of this skill. It is the duty of each commander to improve the style of all his work in the light of the requirements of the 26th Congress of the CPSU.

Needless to say, the flag officer and staff have a great deal to do in this area. Because high quality reviews are a constant requirement, they help improve everything. Ultimately, they have a good impact on all aspects of combat training and further raising ship combat readiness. This is especially important to remember today, at the peak of the summer combat training when the intensity of exercises and cruises is naturally rising.

Interpersonal Relations on Ship Viewed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jul 81 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank-Engineer A. Kontiyevskiy: "Underwater Waves"]

[Text] In certain regions of the ocean seafarers observe the following phenomenon. A small ship in calm weather suddenly loses speed as if it had run into an invisible obstacle. Engine rpm's are increased but the speed of travel stays very low.

This phenomenon is called "dead water," and is explained by the fact that, for a variety of reasons, waves that are invisible from the flying bridge form at depth and a large part of the energy in the ship's engine must be used to overcome them.

On rare occasions something similar may be observed in the life of certain sub-units. It appears that the commander is very active and the men are working hard too, but the speed of advance toward the heights of military skill is not as high as it could be. And this is all because part of the efforts are eaten up by invisible, at first glance, "underwater" waves that arise in the micro-climate of the collective under certain circumstances. Here is an example.

Battalion commander Maj Yu. Andrianov assembled his officers and warrant officers for a meeting. They certainly had something to talk about. The day before the unit had held a drill inspection and the battalion had received numerous criticisms.

And now at the meeting the battalion commander, without resting his glance on anyone or mentioning the name of anyone in attendance, stated in loud tones that the warrant officers were to blame for what happened. The major did not hold back; in his anger he threatened to discharge them all into the reserve.

Suddenly a retort rang out: "I am sick of hearing insults. It would be better to discharge us!"

The door slammed loudly. Young WO V. Pritulyak walked out of the room without permission; for this he received three days detention a few minutes later.

All this happened on the morning of the day when a correspondent from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was coming to the unit to check up on a letter written to the editors. The letter complained, specifically, that Maj Yu. Andrianov "does not trust the warrant officers and treats them rudely."

Nothing more need be said, it would seem. The rudeness was graphically confirmed. Nonetheless, let us try to study the situation without hurrying to conclusions. Let's look at the problem more deeply.

The unit commander and his deputy say the following about Andrianov: a conscientious, strict officer who cares deeply about the work.

Indeed, you cannot take these qualities away from him. Arriving in the unit last summer, the enthusiastic, energetic academy graduate set his goal as making the battalion one of the leaders.

It soon turned out, however, that desire alone is not enough. Appeals and instructions must be backed up with thoughtful, careful indoctrination work with the men. But Andrianov did not have experience in this kind of work, experience creating a good microclimate in the collective. Before the academy he had been an engineer.

The battalion commander was in a hurry to be successful, but there was no sharp turn for the better. The battalion did not become outstanding based on the year's results. It did not fulfill all its obligations for the winter training period either. There were more cases of violation of military discipline. The impatient battalion commander began changing his approach, more often using rude shouting instead of strict regulation standards, and stinging, humiliating words instead of mobilizing, uplifting words. And more and more he addressed these harsh words to the warrant officers.

The battalion had, in addition to senior WO P. Beresnev, WO A. Malinovskiy, and a few others who had served 15-20 years, a small number of new warrant officers. They arrived in the unit from technical schools last July, that is, almost at the same time as the commander. They had become cadets immediately after being drafted into the navy, and had not had an opportunity to serve on ships and in units. In school they had received some knowledge in their specialization, but they did not learn indoctrination skills and how to work with the men. But in the unit they were put in charge of teams and under them

had petty officers and seamen who were of about the same age but were somewhat accustomed to working with the equipment.

The new warrant officers had numerous problems. They sometimes tripped up for no apparent reason. They were not able to saturate their drills with complex inputs or to see that every seaman followed the order of the day on watch duty. And this was not because they did not want to work but rather because they did not have the necessary skills and ability. But Major Andrianov used the attitude of the warrant officers toward the work as an excuse for his every failure and often chewed them out.

At this point the unit commander and political worker for the party committee should have intervened, pointed out to the battalion commander the harm in his working style, and suggested better ways to organize warrant officer training and indoctrination. Unfortunately, this was not done.

It is no surprise that the early development of the new warrant officers is taking a long time. WO V. Koval'chuk, who received two reprimands in a month, is not straightened out yet. WO S. Lysenko makes numerous mistakes. The subordinates of Warrant Officers V. Pritulyak and N. Shevtsov are found on the lists of offenders against military discipline. The general opinion is that only one of the entire group of new warrant officers, WO S. Abramov, is successfully mastering his position and acquiring indoctrination skills. But he admitted to me in a talk, "We need help very much, but at present everybody is stewing in his own juice."

Unfortunately, as the letters to the editor and talks with the seamen indicate, the mistakes and omissions in work with the young warrant officers have not been eliminated in certain other units and ships as well. Thus, the crew commanded by officer L. Shpil'ko lost the leading position it had held earlier in training and competition. In large part this was the result of failure to realize the important role of warrant officers in training and indoctrinating personnel and the lack of a system to help them with early development. WO P. Lagorzhevskiy, who has served in an Arctic garrison for just over a year, wrote to us about the lack of attention to warrant officer concerns and needs. It is no accident that many warrant officer slots in this unit remain vacant for long periods of time.

When I read such letters from new warrant officers I cannot help recalling a recent meeting with WO N. Kravchenko. Kravchenko is now a combat qualified master and one of the most experienced torpedomen in the navy. But few people know how difficult his early days as a warrant officer were.

When Kravchenko took the position, the submariners had a new weapon and the command of the torpedo department was gone. They needed to prepare for a long cruise. The burden of the work fell on the young warrant officer. Many things went wrong. His relations with his subordinates did not take the proper form; some of them were older than him and more experienced both with respect to the equipment and to life itself. Soon Kravchenko decided to forget it all and flagrantly violated discipline himself.

"I don't want to serve any more," the young warrant officer announced to the ship commander. "I have decided to leave the navy!"

"Don't make up your mind too fast," Capt 2nd Rank M. Sibilev answered calmly. "Let's figure, without getting upset, what things are not working for you and why not."

The ship commander had many reassuring talks with the warrant officer. He suggested the best way to handle particular assignments, supported his initiative by all means, and patiently taught him the wisdom of indoctrination work. The department head and party organization were, of course, actively involved also.

A little more than a year later Kravchenko was named the best team petty officer in the unit. Since that time he has never doubted the correctness of his choice of a profession. He has dedicated his life to the difficult work of a submariner, and this is because during his formative period he had a sensitive teacher and commander who was able not only to be strict but also to suggest, show, and teach.

In a letter to the editors WO (Res) V. Kotin thanks his former commanders officers Vostokov and Grishkov for their stern good nature, timely help, and support. "I was fortunate to serve under the command of remarkable men, and this predetermined my subsequent fate. I decided to stay in the navy," WO V. Belous wrote, sharing his feelings in a letter.

But let us go back to Maj Yu. Andrianov.

"But I tried to do everything as well as I could," he told me, definitely upset. "I didn't want to insult the warrant officers; I wanted to pierce their arrogance and make them want to work hard. Maybe I should not be strict at all, if it causes this kind of reaction?"

But none of the young warrant officers complained that the commander was strict. They all cared a great deal about the situation in the battalion, and no one concealed his mistakes or diminished his own fault. But the hurt feelings caused by rude, curt treatment and the lack of help and support are a different matter.

There is something to think about here. People work better and more willingly where they feel constant concern, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized at the 26th party congress. The character traits of the commander, his sensitivity, attention, and tact are just as important in the eyes of his subordinates, especially those in the formative stage, as his engineering training, for example, or his organizational talents. And they have a significant influence on the work. Consistent high standards combined with respect for subordinates and their dignity usually provide a solid foundation for the commander's reputation and help unify the collective. This is the only way to approach the men that will avoid the occurrence of various types of "underwater" waves in the microclimate of the subunit that hinder the accomplishment of optimal results in training and service.

Living Conditions on Board Ship

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jun 81 p 2

[Article by Maj-Gen Intend Serv N. Koblelev, chief of rear services of the Navy: "Concern for the Living Conditions of the Seamen"]

[Text] "Concrete concern for the concrete individual, his needs and requirements," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, "is the beginning and the end of party economic policy." The program of this work advanced by the congress covers all aspects of our life, and each of us sees where to apply his own efforts to carry it out.

Soviet fighting men, including the men of the navy, are aware of the constant party and government concern to meet their everyday material and nonmaterial needs. In the last five-year plan alone thousands of families of officers, warrant officers, and navy civilian workers and employees moved to better housing. New stores and service enterprises appeared in our garrisons. Some personnel supply norms were changed for the better. A new uniform and privileges in issuing it were established for workers and employees of the auxiliary fleet. All these and other steps unquestionably raise the standard of living of the people, have a good effect on their attitude and work capability, and ultimately help them perform the missions of combat training and service.

At the same time it is perfectly obvious that the everyday living conditions of the men of the navy depend not only on those possibilities which the state and the people give us but also on how these possibilities are used in the fleets and garrisons, on every ship and in every military unit. We must see that our people everywhere know that we will take care of them and see that everything in our everyday life is up-to-date and convenient, from work positions to laundry rooms and dining halls. In this the commanders, political agencies, and rear support services have a crucial role. As in every work, so here it is essential to follow a style of work which organically combines high performance and discipline standards with initiative and enterprise.

This style of work is typical today of many commanders, political workers, and economic managers. For example, not long ago food products were delivered to one of the garrisons of the Pacific Fleet only by sea transport. Today they have set up a military sovkhos and the mess hall farming operations have improved their work. As a result, many of the problems of meeting the demand for food products have been solved.

The system used in the Black Sea Fleet to prepare food service specialists for a cruise deserves approval. It includes a compulsory assembly for the cooks of the ships going to sea, working out and arranging for several alternative menus based on the specific conditions of the upcoming cruise, and other activities. The N unit is well-known in the Baltic for good organization of personnel living conditions. Office V. Aksenov is in charge of these matters in the unit. The men are housed in well-appointed buildings, receive all standard supplies on time, and maintain exemplary outward appearance. Last

year alone they spent more than 10,000 rubles to improve living conditions, not counting spending included in the plan. They receive this money by correct organization of economic work in the unit, including a multioperation mess hall farm which produces a good deal of meat and raises vegetables and greens.

Experience teaches us that if the personnel of a unit or a ship are to have living conditions organized in strict conformity with regulations, every commander and rear services chief and specialist must feel deeply responsible for solving all problems that arise in this area quickly and well. This is especially important today when the navy is receiving more and more intricate equipment and weapons and operates on the world ocean. Improving the working and everyday living conditions of the men is one of the ways to increase their resistance to psychological and physical stress. Normal living and recreation conditions have a beneficial effect on a person's mood and attitude toward the assigned work, as well as on the moral climate in the collective as a whole. There is no need to point out how necessary all this is to maintain constant combat readiness, especially on a long cruise. As has been correctly observed, in our naval life it is often hard to tell where military labor ends and everyday living begins. But there is one perfectly clear pattern: where the men can feel a paternal concern for themselves, their achievements in combat training and service are better.

We cannot help recalling here the words of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev from his book "Tselina" [The Virgin Land] to the effect that organizing good living conditions for our people, taking care of them, is not just economic work, but always and above all it is politics! We, the men of the navy, remember very well that when Leonid Il'ich was visiting the fleet he always had a lively interest, among questions, in the everyday living conditions of the men and recommended that greater care be taken to satisfy the material and nonmaterial wants of the fighting men.

A new approach to everyday material support for navy men is becoming established in the navy today. It includes both comprehensive preparation of ships for going to sea and organizing supply to them right in the cruise region. Numerous support ships leave their home bases to meet the ships that are standing watch on the ocean. In these conditions it is very important to take account of all circumstances, from the way that the transport is loaded to the tactical and navigation situation at the rendezvous point. For rear service agencies this necessitates careful planning of the use of these ships, monitoring their work, and quickly solving problems that arise. We are also expected to take a new approach to organizing living conditions for seamen on shore, to consider the growing expectations of the men, and make full use of existing opportunities.

Unfortunately, serious shortcomings are sometimes met in all of these areas and they are not the result of any objective factors, but rather arrive because people fail to show the proper responsibility and initiative. In the Baltic Fleet in recent years, for example, few service and marketing enterprises have been built, even though the need for them is great. The problems of housing, trade, and transportation have still not been solved in a number of garrisons of the Pacific Ocean Fleet.

The seamen of the ship N serve under difficult conditions. Unfortunately, these conditions are made worse by problems with everyday material support. What is more, neither Capt-Lt A. Fadeyev nor the other officers and warrant officers "noticed" the lack of order in the quarters and mess hall and the monotonous diet. An inspection conducted there also showed that checks on management of ship administration and the preservation of material resources on the ship have been lax.

Analysis of such cases illustrates that some commanders and chiefs still consider questions of living conditions to be secondary matters. This is probably why they are not always taken into account in summarizing the results of socialist competition, and the certification of some officers fails to tell whether they take care of their subordinates and manage the support services.

The initiator of competition in the Navy this year was the crew of the atomic missile submarine of the Northern Fleet commanded by Capt 1st Rank G. Nikitin. It is noteworthy that among the important goals which the submariners set for themselves are working for a high level of naval sophistication, maintaining the ship in exemplary condition, participating actively in the competitive inspection for best personal living arrangements, and taking care to use material resources skillfully, efficiently, and economically. This appeal has been widely disseminated and supported in all the ships and units.

The patriotic movement "Model Living Conditions in Every Garrison" is becoming very widespread. It is essential that it achieve concrete results in every military post, that every seaman and every family of an officer or a warrant officer feel its results. To achieve this all party, Komsomol, and trade union organizations and navy public opinion must take an active part in organizing and carrying out work to improve living conditions.

"When solving the problems of providing good living conditions for our men," Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Ministry of Defense, pointed out, "we must always keep our eye on the main thing, the goal toward which all our work is aimed. For us this goal is maintaining high combat readiness in the broad sense." We must continue our work on steadily improving living conditions from the standpoint of this understanding of the importance of these living conditions for the fighting men.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

REVIEW OF BOOK ON ROLE OF SOVIET VOLUNTEERS IN CHINA IN WW II

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Mar 81 p 2

[Review by Maj Gen Avn V. Kumskov, Hero of the Soviet Union, a candidate of military sciences, and a professor, of book "V nebe Kitaya 1937-1940. Vospominaniya sovet-skikh letchikov-dobrovol'tsev" [In the Skies over China, 1937-1940. The Memoirs of Soviet Volunteer Flyers]. Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," Moscow, 382 pages]

[Text] The "Nauka" publishing house has put out a new book, "V nebe Kitaya." This book consists of memoirs of Soviet volunteer flyers who helped the Chinese people in their struggle against Japanese invaders.

It is generally known that the constant and unselfish aid by the Soviet Union to the Chinese people at all stages of their national liberation struggle is a model example of our country's fulfilling of its international obligations.

It is under just such circumstances that the USSR is subject to hostile malicious attacks by open or veiled falsifiers of history. In the last ten years, the Maoists have been particularly successful in this respect, having set upon a course of collusion with U.S. imperialists, "forgetting" that it was the Soviet people that extended the hand of brotherly aid to China during its difficult hour.

One of the brightest pages in the history of Soviet-Chinese relations is our aid to China in strengthening the Chinese air forces from 1937 to 1940: the delivery of over 1200 of the latest aircraft of that time (I-15 and I-16 fighters, SB and DB-3 bombers, and others), the sending of various aviation specialists, the training of Chinese aviators and, finally, the direct participation of Soviet volunteer flyers in military combat actions. Several hundred aviators have been awarded Soviet decorations and medals for feats of combat in battles with the Japanese invaders in the skies over China; 14 became Heroes of the Soviet Union. Two hundred brave Soviet aviator-warriors perished in China. Unfortunately, little -- very little until now -- has been told about all this.

The book "V nebe Kitaya" is timely now because it truthfully recalls, for a wide circle of readers, little known events of over 40 years ago in which Soviet aviators covered themselves with everlasting glory for accomplishing a large number of feats.

The high degree of authenticity of the book is determined by the fact that it was written not by indirect observers, but by direct participants and eye-witnesses who

fought in China and saw the events. Hero of the Soviet Union Col Gen Avn F. Polynin (ret), whose reminiscences introduce the collection, then a captain, commanded the Hankou group of CB bombers. This group had many military feats to its credit, but the outstanding was its flight to the chief Japanese base, Taipei, situated on the island of Taiwan, deep in the rear and, in Japanese opinion, out of range. The Soviet flyers, operating under most difficult conditions, using two airfields for intermediate landing, arrived precisely at the target, made their strike, and returned to their base unharmed.

The result was stunning: 40 aircraft were destroyed, not counting those in crates, hangars and other airfield facilities were demolished or burned and, very important, a three-year supply of fuel was destroyed. The whole world became aware that the boasted "invincible" Japanese aviation capability had borne perceptible losses. For the Chinese people, there emerged not only a reliable shield in the air, but also a striking sword.

Soviet flyers fought in Chinese skies with courage and skill. Col (Ret) D. Kidyimov, one of the flyers in the first Soviet fighter group, writes clearly about this in his recollections. He convincingly testifies that in the very first engagements, Soviet flyers knocked down six Japanese aircraft. He, as well as his commander, A. Blagoveshchenskiy, fought the aces of Japanese aviation -- "the kings of the air" -- and defeated them.

Operations took place under very complicated conditions. Col Gen Avn F. Dobysh recalls the difficulties of cross-country flight over undeveloped and unequipped routes for several thousand kilometers. He tells also of flights to Japanese airfields and ships, of flights in formation with Chinese flyers, and of flight training for Chinese.

The military contribution to the struggle against the invaders of one of the Trans-Baykal bomber groups is narrated by its former commander, now Hero of the Soviet Union Lt Gen Avn S. Slyusarev (ret). Just from May to October 1938, this group destroyed more than 70 military and transport ships and about 30 aircraft at airfields, they knocked down 15 enemy fighters in air engagements, and destroyed a large quantity of enemy forces and materiel on transport ships and battlefields.

The heroism and selflessness of the Soviet volunteers who fought for the freedom of the Chinese people gained the love and respect of the common people of China.

The book "V nebe Kitaya" puts objective light on the role of the Soviet Union and its volunteer flyers, who gave international aid to the national liberation struggle of the Chinese people against the Japanese militarists. The memoirs of the Soviet volunteer flyers are a striking illustration of the courage of the Soviet people and of their dedication to international duty.

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